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and so bring particular things and events under definite laws of interaction; therefore by induction alone can we get such knowledge as will enable us to forecast the future; and knowledge which shall help us to forecast the future—to tell what will take place under given circumstances and as the result of given actions—is the only knowledge which can serve as a guide in practical life, whether moral or otherwise.

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## INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHIE DER RELIGION," BY F. L. SOLDAN.

### II.

#### *The Position of the Philosophy of Religion in regard to Philosophy and in regard to Religion.*

##### 1. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION IN GENERAL.

From what we said above, namely, that philosophy makes religion the object of its contemplation, and from the further apparent fact that contemplation and the object of contemplation are two different things, it would seem as if our inquiry were still dealing with that relation in which the two sides are independent of each other and remain in separation. If this were the true relation, our contemplation would necessarily step out of the field of piety and enjoyment which religion forms, and contemplation, which is the movement of thought, would become as different [from religion] as, for instance, the diagram and figures in pure mathematics are from the spirit which contemplates them. But this is in its first appearance only of such relation, when cognition is still in a state of diremption with the religious side, and is finite cognition. If we examine this question more closely, we see that, as a matter of fact, philosophy has content, needs, and interests in common with religion.

The subject of religion as well as philosophy is the eternal truth in its objectivity, or God, nothing else but God, and God's explanation. Philosophy is not the wisdom of [this] world, but the

cognition of what is not of this world; not the cognition of the external universe, of empirical existence and life, but the cognition of what is eternal, of God and whatever flows from his nature. For this nature must reveal and develop itself. The explication of philosophy involves, therefore, the explication of religion, and its own explication is also that of Religion. Philosophy, in its occupation with this eternal truth which is in and for itself, is the occupation of thinking spirit and not of caprice or of a special interest in this subject, and it is therefore identical in its activity with that of religion. The spirit, in its philosophical reasoning, enters upon this subject with as much energy, and renounces its particularity as fully, when it penetrates its object, as religious consciousness does, which will give up all particularity and forget itself in this content.

Thus religion and philosophy coalesce; philosophy is really in itself a cult, or religion, for it is the renunciation of subjective notions and opinions in the occupation with God. Philosophy, therefore, is identical with religion, but with the distinction that it is so in a peculiar mode, different from that which we are accustomed to call religion proper. Their common characteristic is that each is religion, but they differ in regard to their mode and manner of being religion. They differ from each other in the mode of their occupation with God, and in this are found the difficulties which seem so insuperable that it is considered impossible to identify philosophy and religion. Hence the apprehensions of theology in regard to philosophy, and the hostile position of religion and philosophy. This Theology assumes that such a hostile position exists, and, when it looks upon it from the standpoint thus assumed, philosophy seems to have a corrupting, destructive, and desecrating influence on the content of religion, and its occupation with God seems to be altogether different from religion. This is the old contrast and contradiction, which we find first among the Greeks; with the Athenians, this free democratic people, writings were burned and Socrates condemned to death. In our times such contrast is generally admitted to exist, and finds more credence than the Unity of religion and philosophy which we have just asserted.

And yet, old as this contrast is, the connection between philosophy and religion is just as old. Even to the Neo-Pythagoreans

and Neo-Platonists, standing as they do within the pagan world, the Gods of the people were no longer the Gods of phantasy, but they had become to them Gods of thought. Such connection is found also with the principal Fathers of the Church, who were essentially philosophical in their religious attitude, for their fundamental principle was that theology is religion as it appears to thinking, philosophical consciousness. To their philosophical culture the Church owes the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This union of religion and philosophy was still more thoroughly carried out during the middle ages. There was so little fear that any injury could come to faith through philosophical cognition, that the latter was considered essential for the development of faith itself. Those great men, Anselmus and Abelard, worked at the further development of the determinations of faith from the standpoint of philosophy.

Cognition, when it reared its own world, distinct from that of religion, had mastered the finite content only; but, when it developed into true philosophy, its content became the same as that of religion.

If we inquire into the difference between religion and philosophy, as it shows itself in this unity of content, we find it to be as follows:

*a.* Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the idea [German: *Idee*], so that everything is conceived as idea; the idea, however, is the True in [the form of] thought, and not as mere precept or image-concept (*Vorstellung*). The True in [the form of] thought may be explained, more particularly speaking, as that which is concrete, which is posited as dirempted in itself in such a mode that the two sides of the diremption are contrasting categories of thinking (*Denkbestimmungen*), whose unity the idea is conceived to be. To think speculatively means to analyze a reality so that the differences, as determinations or categories of thought, are contrasts, and that the object is conceived as the unity of the two. Our perception looks upon the object as a whole, our reflection distinguishes and conceives [the existence of] various sides; it cognizes manifold elements in them, and severs them. Reflection, in considering these differences, does not bear in mind their unity; at one time it forgets the whole, at another the differences [or

parts], and when it has both in mind it separates the object from its qualities, and represents both in such a way that that in which the two coalesce becomes a third something, which is different from the object and its qualities. Such a relation may exist in mechanical objects which belong to externality altogether, for with them the object is but the dead substratum of the differences, and the quality of being One is the collection of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not an aggregate, not a merely externally joined plurality, the object is one with the distinguished determinations, and it is speculation alone which conceives unity in the contrast itself as such. It is the general business of speculation ever to grasp all the objects of pure thought, of nature, and of spirit in the form of thought, and thus to conceive them as the unity of the difference.

b. Religion itself is the standpoint of the consciousness of the True which is in and for itself; it is therefore that phase of spirit in which consciousness has for its subject the speculative content in general. Religion is not the consciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolutely true, of the True as Universal, as All-comprehending truth beyond which nothing else exists. The content of its consciousness is, in the next place, the universally true which is in and for itself, which is self-determined, and not determined from the outside. While the finite depends on something else for its determinations, the True has its determination, its limit, its aim, within itself; it is not limited by another, but the other lies within it. This is the speculative principle of which we become conscious in religion. There is, indeed, truth in every other sphere as well, but not the highest, absolute truth, for this exists only in perfect universality of determination and in that which is determined in and for itself. To be determined in and for itself is not simple determinateness, which exists in regard to another thing, but that which contains the other, the difference, within itself.

c. Religion contains this speculative principle as a state of consciousness, as it were, whose sides are not simple determinations [or categories] of thinking, but are filled with concrete content. These phases can be no other than the phase of thinking, active universality, activity of thinking, and reality as immediate, particular self-consciousness. While in philosophy, on the one hand, the

rigidity of these two sides vanishes through a conciliation by thinking—for both sides are thoughts, and it is not true that one only is pure universal thinking and the other empirical, individual [in] character,—religion, on the other hand, can attain the enjoyment of unity only through lifting these two hard extremes out of their diremption, and by elaborating and uniting them. For the reason that religion divests its extremes of the form of diremption, dissolving the contrast through the element of universality, it remains akin to thought in form and movement even, and philosophy, as the ever active thinking through which contrasts are united, stands in the closest relation to it.

The thinking contemplation of religion has transformed its particular phases into thought, and the question arises, as to the general relation in which this thinking contemplation of religion holds as a department of the system of philosophy.

## 2. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

*a.* In philosophy the highest [principle] is called the absolute, the idea ; it is superfluous to trace this [doctrine] back, and to show how in the Wolfian philosophy this highest [principle] was called *ENS*, Thing ; for the latter term proclaims itself as an abstraction which is not sufficiently adequate to our idea of God. The absolute in more recent philosophy is not an abstraction to the same extent, but, for all that, it has not yet the same signification as our term, God. In order to show the difference fully, we must first consider what “Signification” itself signifies. When we ask what is the signification of this or that [expression], we ask for two, and, moreover, two opposite things.

In the first place, we ask for what we call the meaning, the purpose, the general thought of such or such an expression, or work of art, etc. [In this sense] we ask for the inherent [meaning], and what we try to conceive is the thought. If we ask in this sense : What is God? what signifies the expression, “God”? we want the thought—although we may, possibly, already possess an image-concept (*Vorstellung*). It means, therefore, that the logical idea is to be stated, and the logical idea is therefore the signification. What we want is the absolute, God’s nature expressed in thought, a logical knowledge of him. This is one signification of the

“signification,” and in this respect that which we call the absolute signifies the same as the expression, God.

b. But the question is asked, also, in a second sense, which calls for the opposite. If we begin with the pure logical definitions and not with the image-concept (*Vorstellung*), it may happen that the spirit neither finds satisfaction in it, nor feels at home there, and will ask for the signification of this purely logical definition. Thus we have, for instance, the definition of [God, as] the unity of the subjective and the objective, or the unity of the real and ideal. One might understand every part of this definition by itself, and know very well what unity, subjective, objective, etc., mean, but, nevertheless, confess that he does not understand this definition. When we ask the question in this sense, the signification is the opposite from that mentioned before. What is asked for now is an image-concept corresponding to the logical definition, an example of the content which was given in the form of thought only. If we find the content of a thought difficult, the difficulty lies in the circumstance that we possess no image-conception of it. Through an example the signification is explained, and thus alone the spirit sees itself in this content.

In case we begin with the image-concept of God, the philosophy of religion must consider the signification of this concept, namely, that God is the Idea, the Absolute, the Being comprehended in thought and idea, and philosophy of religion has this in common with logical philosophy. The logical idea is God as he is in himself [or *in potentia*]. But it is God's essence that he is not merely *in* himself [or potentially]; he is just as essentially *for* himself [or actually]. He is the absolute spirit who does not contain himself in thought, but gives to himself phenomenality and objectivity.

c. In thus considering in the philosophy of religion the Idea of God, the mode, also, of his image-conception is placed before us: he is conceived by himself only. This is the absolute on the side of its existence in time and space [*Dasein*]. In the philosophy of religion we have thus the absolute for our subject, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its manifestations. The universal idea is, therefore, to be understood in the purely and simply concrete signification of being on one side, essence in general (*Wesentlichkeit überhaupt*), and, on the other, in its activity of positing itself externally, of becoming a phenomenon, of

revealing itself. It is a common saying that God is the Lord of the world of nature and of spirits; that he is the absolute harmony of the two, and that which produces and sustains this harmony. In these expressions neither the thought, nor the concept, nor its existence in time and space (*Dasein*), its manifestation, is wanting. But, since this is a philosophical inquiry, the side of existence in time and space (*Dasein*) itself must be comprehended in the form of thought.

Thus, philosophy considers the absolute, in the first place, as the logical idea, as the idea as it exists in thought, whose content is formed by the determinations and definitions of thought. Philosophy shows the absolute in its activity also, in its creations; this is the process of the absolute itself, namely, to become Being for itself, to become spirit. God is thus the result of philosophy, but a result known not simply as result, but as producing itself and being its own presupposition. The one-sidedness of the result is annulled in the result itself.

Nature, finite spirit, the world of consciousness, of intelligence and will, are incarnations of the divine idea, but they are distinct forms or special modes in which the idea appears, forms which are not yet so permeated with the idea, that the idea is in itself in being in them, and exists as absolute spirit.

In the philosophy of religion we consider the potential (*die an sich seyende*) logical idea not merely as determined as pure thought, nor simply in its finite determinations where it is in some finite mode of its phenomenality, but rather as it is in itself [or potentially] in thought, and also how it becomes a phenomenon, how it manifests itself. Such phenomenality or manifestation, however, is an infinite one, for it is that of spirit reflecting itself within itself. Spirit which does not become manifest, or phenomenal, does not exist. In this determination of phenomenality there is contained the finite phenomenon also—that is, the world of nature and the world of finite spirit—but spirit is the [creative] force underlying the latter, which produces them from itself, and itself from them.

This is the position which the philosophy of religion occupies in regard to the other departments of philosophy. God, in the other departments, is a result, but here this end is made the beginning, and forms our special subject. It is considered as the purely and simply concrete idea with its infinite phenomenality—



and this determination concerns the *content* of the philosophy of religion. This content we consider with thinking reason; this regards the *form*, and leads us to [the consideration of] the position of the philosophy of religion in regard to positive religion.

3. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO POSITIVE  
RELIGION.

It is a well-known fact that the faith of the Church, and more particularly of the Protestant Church, has been fixed in the form of a dogma. This content has generally passed for truth, and, as a definition of the nature of God and of man's relation to God, it has been called a creed, which means, in a subjective sense, that which is believed, and, in an objective sense, that which should be recognized in the Christian Church as the content [of religion], and which is the mode in which God has revealed himself. As a common, definite dogma, this content is embodied partly in the apostolic symbol, and partly in the later symbolic books. In the Protestant Church the custom prevails to regard the Bible as the essential basis of the Dogma.

*a.* In the cognition and definition of the doctrinal content, reason forms an element of the argument. At the beginning of this course the doctrinal content of the Bible was still made the positive basis of the argument, and thinking was to be merely the exegesis which collects the thoughts of the Bible. But, as a matter of fact, the understanding had previously and independently fixed its views and thoughts before it began to inquire how the words of the Scripture might be explained in accordance therewith. The words of the Bible form a presentation which is not systematic. They are Christianity as it appeared at the beginning; spirit alone comprehends the content and explains it. Through the fact that the exegesis calls in Reason as adviser, it has come to pass that the so-called rationalistic theology has sprung up, which has put itself in contrast to that Dogma of the Church, or that the latter places itself in contrast with it. In this process the exegesis takes the written Word, interprets it, and pretends to aim at nothing but to bring to light the true spirit of the word and to adhere to it faithfully.

But, no matter whether the Bible is adopted for the basis merely as a matter of courtesy, or whether it is so adopted in good faith,

the nature of all interpreting explanation requires that thought must have its share in it. Thought contains inherent in it definitions, principles, and presuppositions, which come into play in the work of interpretation. If interpretation is not merely verbal explanation, but an explanation of the meaning, it must carry its own thoughts into the word which is its basis. Mere word-interpretation can do no more than to substitute one word for another of the same scope. In an explanation, however, further logical reflections [Gedankenbestimmungen] are connected with it; for explication means the evolution of further thoughts. Apparently we still adhere to the meaning, but, in fact, we develop further thoughts. The commentaries on the Bible are not simply guides which introduce us to a knowledge of the content of the Scriptures, but rather present to us the mode of thought of their own time. The intention is, to state the meaning of the word; but a statement of the meaning implies that the latter be drawn forth into consciousness, into conception, and [therefore] the conception, which has categories of its own, becomes a factor in the exposition of thought, which is represented as being simply the meaning. Even in the exposition of such fully developed philosophic systems, as, for instance, that of Plato or Aristotle, the various presentations and expositions differ according to the peculiarly constituted conception of every expounder that undertakes it. Theology has proved exegetically the most contrary opinions out of Scripture, and thus this so-called Sacred Writ has been treated like a nose of wax. There is no heresy which has not appealed to Scripture in the same way as the Church itself.

b. Rationalistic theology, which thus originated, did not confine itself to exegesis on the basis of the Bible, but, proceeding to free cognition, it assumed a certain relation to religion and its content. In this more general relation the process and the result can be no other than that cognition takes possession of whatever is fixed and given in religion. The doctrine of God thus branches out into definitions, qualities, and actions of God. Cognition seizes this definite content and claims it as its own. In its finite mode it conceives, on the one hand, the infinite as something which possesses limitations (als ein Bestimmtes) as abstract infinity, and thereupon, on the other hand, it finds that all special qualities are inadequate to the infinite. Thus by its own mode it annihilates the religious

content and completely impoverishes the absolute object. This mode of cognition knows very well that the finitude of limitation which it has drawn into its circle points toward a world beyond, but it conceives the latter in a finite manner as an abstract highest being to which no character whatever is attributed. Rationalism (*Aufklärung*)—for so is the system of cognition just described called—imagines that it places God very high when it calls him the infinite for which all predicates are inadequate and unjustifiable anthropomorphisms, but, in reality, while conceiving God as the highest being, it has made this idea hollow, void, and poor.

c. If it should seem as if the philosophy of religion stood on the same basis with the theology of rationalism, and is therefore in the same contrast with the content of religion, this is a delusion which will disappear soon, from the following considerations :

1. By that rationalistic consideration of religion (which is identical with the abstract metaphysics of the understanding) God was conceived as an abstraction which is empty ideality and to which finitude forms an external contrast. From this standpoint morality, as a special science, is the doctrine of what belongs to the side of the real subject in regard to action and conduct. The other side, that of the relation of man to God, was distinct and separate by itself. Thinking reason, however, which does not stand in the attitude of abstraction, but starts from man's belief in the dignity of his spirit, and, deriving its impulse from the courage which truth and freedom give it, conceives truth as something concrete, as fulness of content, as ideality in which limitation or finitude is contained as a phase. God, according to this view, is not empty [abstraction], but spirit, and this definition of spirit not a mere word, but it sees the development of the nature of spirit in its cognition of God as triune. Thus God is conceived as making himself his own object—in which distinction the object remains identical with God, and God loves himself in the object. Without this definition of the trinity, God could not be spirit, and spirit would be an empty word. But when God is conceived as spirit, this conception includes the subjective side, or it itself develops into it, and the philosophy of religion [therefore] is a thinking contemplation of religion which encompasses the whole definite content of religion.

2. As far as that form of contemplation is concerned which

confines itself to the words of the Holy Writ, and maintains that it explains the same through reason, it, too, occupies apparently only the same basis as the philosophy of religion. For that mode of contemplation makes its own arguments arbitrarily the basis of Christian doctrine, and, while it allows the words of the Bible to stand, it makes its own particular opinion the principle to which the presupposed biblical truth must subordinate itself. This mode of reasoning retains thus its own presupposition, and moves within the limits of reflecting understanding without subjecting the latter to criticism. The philosophy of religion, as cognition through reason, forms a contrast to the arbitrariness of this mode of reasoning; it is the reason of the universal, striving for unity.

Philosophy is so far from walking on the common high-road of thought of that rationalistic theology, and from this exegetical mode of reasoning, that it finds itself most exposed to their warfare and calumnies. They protest against philosophy for the sole purpose of reserving for themselves the right of their own arbitrary reasoning. They call philosophy a *spécialty* (etwas particulars), whereas it is naught but rational and truly universal thinking. To them philosophy appears like a ghost, a spook, of which no one knows exactly what it is—something alarming; but in this estimate [of philosophy] they only show that they find it more convenient to remain on the standpoint of their own fantastic, arbitrary reflections, which philosophy cannot look upon as theology. Those theologians whose arguments move within the limits of the exegesis and who appeal to the Bible for every one of their wild notions, and who deny to philosophy the possibility of cognition, have carried things so far, and have lowered the respect for the Bible so much, that, if their views were correct, and no cognition of the nature of God were possible from a proper explanation of the Bible, spirit would be compelled to look for another source to gain full truth.

3. Philosophy cannot stand in a contrast to positive religion and to the doctrine of the Church, which has preserved its positive content, in the manner in which this is done by the metaphysics of the understanding and rationalizing exegesis. It will be shown, on the contrary, that its kinship to the positive doctrine is infinitely greater than appears at a first glance, and that the rehabilitation of the dogma of the Church, after it had been reduced

by the understanding to a minimum, is so largely the work of philosophy that, for this very reason—which is its true content—it has been decried as an obscuration of spirit<sup>1</sup> by a rationalistic theology which does not rise above the limits of the understanding.

The fears of the understanding and its hatred against philosophy originate in the apprehension with which it sees philosophy reducing the reflections of the understanding to their [true] basis; that is to say, to an affirmative principle on which the understanding becomes shipwrecked, while philosophy finds [there] a content and a cognition of the nature of God after all content had seemed cancelled and annulled. A content of any kind appears to that negative view an adumbration or obscuration of spirit, although its very object is to remain in the night which it calls rationalism, and to which indeed every ray of the light of cognition must appear hostile.

It may suffice here to say, in regard to the supposed contrast of the philosophy of religion with positive religion, that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit, not a divine reason and a human reason, not a divine spirit and a human one, absolutely different from each other. Human reason, or the consciousness of its essence, is reason in general; it is the divine principle in man. Spirit, in so far as it is the spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world; God is present, is omnipresent, and, as spirit, he is in every spirit. God is a living God, and is all energy and action. Religion is a creation of divine spirit, not an invention of man, but the work of the divine activity and creativeness in him. The expression that God as reason rules the world would be senseless if we did not assume that it refers to religion, and that the divine spirit is active in the determination and formation of it. The perfection of reason through thinking does not stand in any contrast to this spirit, and, therefore, it cannot absolutely differ from the work which spirit has produced in religion. The more man, in his rational thinking, allows the object itself to fill his mind

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<sup>1</sup> TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Hegel's argument is based on the relative position which he assigns to understanding and reason, the former being the faculty which conceives the finite and its relations, while the latter conceives the infinite. Any attempt, therefore, to apply to the infinite and divine the reasoning process of the methods of the understanding, Hegel considers futile and fraught with inevitable error. Hegel's view reminds us of Dante's "Reason, when following the footsteps of the senses, has short wings."

freely, the more he renounces his particularity and tries to reason from the standpoint of universal consciousness; and the more his reason refrains from seeking its own in the sense of a particular, the less will it be liable to descend to that contrast. For the object is reason itself, spirit, divine spirit.

The Church or the theologians may refuse this succor or take offence at seeing their doctrine stated in terms of reason; they may even reject with haughty irony the endeavors of philosophy—although these are not only not hostile to religion, but rather aim at fathoming its truth—and make merry about the “fabricated” truth. But this disdain is to no avail, and becomes idle vanity after the need of cognition and its contrast to religion has once arisen. Judgment has its rights which cannot be withheld in any manner, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the contrast.

Although philosophy, as philosophy of religion, is so very different from the rationalistic views—which in their heart are hostile to religion—and is by no means the spectre which it has been represented usually, we see, nevertheless, even to-day, that the most rigid contrast between philosophy and religion is made the shibboleth of the times. All the principles of religious consciousness which have sprung up in the present time—no matter how their forms differ among themselves—agree in this one point: that they wage war against philosophy, and that they try to make it refrain at any rate from concerning itself with religion. It therefore becomes our business to consider the relation in which philosophy stands to these principles of our time. Such an investigation seems all the more auspicious, as we shall see that, in spite of that hostility to philosophy, in spite of enemies in many directions or in each and every direction of the consciousness of the present day, the time has come when philosophy may take religion for the subject of its investigation without prejudice or favor, and in a happy and profitable manner. For its opponents are those forms of divided consciousness which we have considered above. These rest either on the standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding—for which God is [an] empty [idea] of which the content has disappeared—or on the standpoint of feeling which, after the loss of the absolute content, has retired into its empty inwardness, but which agrees with that metaphysics in the result, that every definition or predication is inadequate to the eternal content

—which they treat as an abstraction. We shall even see that there is nothing in the assertions of the opponents of philosophy but what philosophy itself contains as its principle and as the basis of its principle. This contradiction—that the opponents of philosophy are also the opponents of religion whom philosophy has conquered, and that they nevertheless possess in their reflections the principle of philosophic cognition—finds its explanation in the fact that they are the historical element out of which the perfect philosophical thinking has developed itself.

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BRADLEY'S "PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC."<sup>1</sup>

BY S. W. DYDE.

The question as to whether Logic has anything to do with Metaphysic, at one time either wholly or partially ignored, admits now of only one answer. It has come to be understood that Metaphysic bears a relation to Logic similar to the relation between the trunk of a tree and some of the branches. Not only in Logic, but also in Ethics, is this relation now admitted to hold good. Because of this, Green, in his latest work, "*Prolegomena to Ethics*," saw the necessity of making plain, first of all, his metaphysical basis. Those who discuss logical or ethical questions, either explicitly or implicitly, make use of metaphysical principles. Inasmuch as, however, one may attempt to ignore the fact that his ethical or logical system depends upon a metaphysical position, it is better to preface any announcement of such a system by stating, as clearly as possible, the principles intended to be used. Those who have not done so have been prevented by different motives. Some have a horror for the seeming endlessness of Metaphysic, and so think the best course to pursue is to have nothing whatever to do with it. Some may have thought that their principles would of themselves become apparent in the progress of their work. But the main reason, no doubt, is that this

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<sup>1</sup> "The Principles of Logic." By F. H. Bradley, LL. D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Kegan Paul, French & Co., 1 Paternoster Square, 1883.